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I Comments I
Protecting Trade Secrets: Is the Remedy
Worse than the Wrong?
I. Introduction: The Trade Secret Dilemma
How do you prove you have a secret without giving the secret
away? Two cases involving misappropriation of trade secrets,
spanning the country geographically and encompassing both civil
and criminal law, have recently grappled with this quandary! Imax
Corp. v. Cinema Technologies, Inc.' and United States v. Hsu'
highlight the difficulty businesses face when they attempt to enforce
their intellectual property rights and to comply with civil and
criminal procedure without exposing the very formulas, protocols,
or designs that they seek to protect.
Tension arises because a business, or in the case of criminal
law, the government, must prove the existence of a trade secret, the
sine qua non of prosecuting a case, and must divulge confidential
information to do so. Thus, a corporation suing for theft of trade
secrets or cooperating with a criminal prosecution could face having
1. See Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1162 (9th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022, 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 189,
191 (3d Cir. 1998).
2. 152 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1998).
3. 982 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997, rev'd, 155 F. 3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
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to bare its valuable innovations to the very people who are alleged
to have stolen them.
This Comment will first summarize the background and
current status of trade secret law, as well as the discovery processes
involved in federal civil and criminal litigation. It will then analyze
the courts' decisions in Imax and Hsu in light of the Catch-22 in
which businesses find themselves when trying to protect their
intellectual property while simultaneously keeping their trade
secrets just that- secret. Ultimately, this Comment will critique the
courts' willingness, based on an unrealistic reliance on the
effectiveness of protective orders, to compel discovery of trade
secrets to a company's direct competitor.
II. Background
A. The Pros and Cons of Trade Secrets
Concern for promoting scientific progress by protecting
inventions and other forms of intellectual property is so deeply
rooted in American jurisprudence that the Framers of the
Constitution included patenting as one of Congress' enumerated
powers. Patents, however, have their limitations.' Grounded on
statutes and ultimately the Constitution, patents have a limited life
span.6 After the statutory 17-year period,7 a formula or design that
went on public record when the inventor filed the patent suddenly
becomes fair game for the competition.8 On the other hand, in a
rapidly changing technological environment, computer software for
example, the benefit of patenting an invention destined to become
obsolete within three years may not justify the time and expense
involved in obtaining a 17-year patent.'
Faced with these limitations, corporations put their faith in
trade secret law which has its foundation in common law and
equity."0 A company that can keep a secret can continue to profit
from its rivals' inability to duplicate the company's process or
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. See ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS, § 2.03(1984).
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
7. See id.
8. See Anne Marriot, Companies Gamble on Keeping Secrets, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1997, at B6.
9. See id.
10. See SEIDEL, supra note 5 at § 1.01(b).
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formula." Well-known and publicized is Coca-Cola's success in
keeping its formula stashed in an Atlanta bank vault for nearly 100
years. Kentucky Fried Chicken hides its recipe of eleven herbs
and spices in a time capsule guarded day and night at a secret
location."
Of course, relying on maintaining a trade secret rather than
patenting an innovation has its drawbacks, too. 4 A trade secret
may be lost, as was Stradivari's method for treating wood which
died with the famous violin-maker." Conversely, the secret may be
exposed by, for example, a former employee: Kodak experienced
this situation when a 28-year engineering veteran retired, started his
own consulting company, and, according to Kodak, sold
confidential documents, blueprints, and records to Minnesota
Mining and Manufacturing Corporation (3M). 6
A company's security is further undermined by the fact that,
under trade secret law, competitors are free to duplicate an existing
invention by "fair and honest means.",'7 Thus, a company that fails
to patent an innovation may lose the value of its uniqueness to a
rival through independent invention, accidental disclosure, or
reverse engineering." More ominously, a company that sues for
theft of trade secrets, or one that cooperates with the government's
criminal prosecution, may have to comply with discovery orders to
turn over those same trade secrets to the defendant.'9 This ticklish
situation presented itself in Imax v. Cinema Technologies,° a Ninth
11. See Marriot, supra note 8, at B6.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See SEIDEL, supra note 5, at § 1.01(e); Marriot, supra note 8, at B1 (quoting
Renee Marlin-Bennett, director of the Global Intellectual Property Project at the
American University, as saying, "Trade secrets are like making a bargain with the
devil.... It's the idea that I get to keep this in perpetuity for as long as I keep it
secret.").
15. See SEIDEL, supra note 5 at § 1.01(d).
16. See Mike Mills, Testing the Limits on Trade Secrets; Kodak Lawsuit is
Likely to Have Broad Impact on Use of Confidential Data, WASH. POST, Dec. 9,
1997, at C1.
17. Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982).
18. See id. Congress reinforced this common-law view when it enacted the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831-9 (West Supp.), stating, "This
legislation is not intended to apply to innocent innovators or to individuals who
seek to capitalize on the personal knowledge, skill, or abilities they may have
developed." H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 7 (1996).
19. See Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1162 (9th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022, 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 189,
191 (3d Cir. 1998).
20. 152 F.3d 1161.
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Circuit civil suit, and in United States v. Hsu," a Third Circuit
criminal case.
B. A Brief History of Trade Secret Law
Until recently, common law almost exclusively formed the
foundation of the civil law of trade secrets.22 The Restatement of
Torts defines the term "trade secret" as a formula, pattern, device,
or compilation of information used in business, which affords an
advantage over competitors who do not possess the technology.23
According to the Restatement, relevant factors in determining the
existence of a trade secret include: the extent to which the
information is known by outsiders as well as inside employees; what
steps were taken to maintain the secrecy of the information; the
value of the information; the amount of effort or money spent
developing the information; and how difficult the information
would be to duplicate or otherwise properly acquire.24
Due to uneven development and uncertainty in trade secret
law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act emerged in 1979.2 Since then
forty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted it.
26
Under the Uniform Act, a trade secret is:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and (2) is the subject of efforts that
27are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
On the criminal side of the law, the federal government
recently enacted the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) 28 in
an attempt to protect trade secrets in a more broad and uniform
fashion 9 Congress recognized that existing federal law, such as
statutes against mail and wire fraud, had several gaps and
21. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1022; Hsu, 155 F.3d at 189.
22. See Arthur J. Schwab & David J. Porter, Federal Protection of Trade
Secrets: Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 4 J. PROPRIETARY
RTS. 2, 2 (1998).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
24. See id.
25. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985).
26. See Schwab, supra note 22, at 2.
27. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1831-1839 (Supp. IV 1998).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 6-7 (1996).
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inadequacies.3° Congress also believed that state civil remedies are
often insufficient because companies lack the time and resources to
investigate crime and to litigate, or because defendants have few or
no assets.3 Finally, Congress noted that while a few states have
criminal laws against this type of theft, most of those laws make
trade secret theft a mere misdemeanor and prosecutors rarely seek
a conviction under these laws.32
The EEA attempts to provide a "comprehensive and
systematic"33 solution that will "put some teeth into the punish-
ment"' 4 for trade secret theft and other forms of industrial
espionage.35 Consisting of two main sections, the Act prohibits the
30. See World Wide Threats to National Security: Hearing on Threat to U.S.
National Security Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 105th Cong.
(1998) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-
788, at 14. In his signing statement, President William J. Clinton notes that "Until
today, Federal law has not accorded appropriate or adequate protection to trade
secrets, making it difficult to prosecute thefts involving this type of information.
Law enforcement officials relied instead on antiquated laws that have not kept
pace with the technological advances of modern society." Id.; Hsu, 155 F.3d at
194-95. The court notes that before enactment of the Economic Espionage Act,
prosecutors were forced to "shoehorn economic espionage crimes into statutes
directed at other offenses," including the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314, or the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343. Id.
31. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 6-7. But see Corporate Legal Times
Roundtable: Protecting Trade Secrets Requires Multiple Approaches, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 1998, at 48 [herinafter Corporate Legal Times Roundtable]. Lawrence
J. McCabe, senior vice president and general counsel of the H.J. Heinz Co.,
cautions that corporations who decide to turn over their cases to the government
to prosecute criminally, run a significant risk because they lose control over the
case. "You just can't quit if the prosecutor intends to proceed. The Taxol case
[U.S. v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 191 (3aJ Cir. 1998)] really demonstrates the concert
there." Id.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 6-7.
33. Id. at 14.
34. Stan Crock & Jonathan Moore, Corporate Spies Feel a Sting: The Feds Get
Serious, But is a New Law Tough Enough?, Bus. WK., July 14, 1997, at 76; see also
18 U.S.C. § 1831-1839 (Supp. IV 1998) (a section 1831 violation could result in a
fifteen-year prison sentence and a fine of up to $500,000 for an individual or
$10,000,000 for an organization; a § 1832 violation could result in a ten-year prison
sentence and fine of up to $250,000 for individuals or $5,000,000 for an
organization).
35. See Corporate Legal Times Roundtable, supra note 31, at 48. David E.
Green, deputy chief of the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of
the U.S. Department of Justice's Criminal Division believes that:
[it] sends a message throughout the community that just as people can't
come in and steal your computer, they also can't steal information in your
computer. They can't steal what is more and more becoming the crucial
information of business. As long as that message gets broadcast, it will
have a deterrent effect.
Id. Richard J. Munsch, assistant general counsel for U.S. Steel Group, notes that
"people sit up a little bit straighter in their chairs and eyes open when we start
2000]
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theft of trade secrets with the intent to benefit a foreign
government under section 1831,36 and criminalizes trade secret theft
more generally under section 1832.3" The Act defines "trade secret"
broadly, and, like the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,38 stipulates only
that the owner must have taken reasonable measures to keep the
information secret and that the information derive actual or
potential independent economic value from not being generally
known to or ascertainable by the public.39
talking about fines, criminal penalties and jail terms." Id.
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (Supp. IV 1998).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 provides:
(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or
included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or
foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other that the
owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any
owner of that trade secret, knowingly-
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away,
or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such
information;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws,
photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies,
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or
conveys such information;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same
to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without
authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1)
through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense
described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such
persons do act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(b) Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection
(a) shall be fined not more than $5,000,000.
38. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) provides:
the term "trade secret" means all forms and types of financial, business,
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs,
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or
codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored,
compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing if-
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, the public.
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C. Discovery and the Protective Order
In civil litigation before a federal court, Rule 34 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to demand the production
of documents and other items.4 The requesting party is not
required to prove that the items would be admissible at trial, but
must merely describe them with reasonable particularity.41 The
responding party may object to the demand, whereupon the
42discovering party may file a motion to compel production.
Most objections to demands for discovery are filed under Rule
26(c).43 This rule provides that upon motion by a party and for
good cause, the court may make any order that justice requires to
shield a party from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense," including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be
had only on specified terms and conditions, including a
designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be
had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by
the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be
inquired into, or that the scope of discovery be limited to certain
matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present
except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition
after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that
a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in
a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file
specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 44
Under Rule 26(c)(7), if the court finds that the information
sought is a trade secret, the burden shifts to the discovering party to
prove the necessity and relevance of the requested information."
Courts use the factors outlined above in the Restatement of Torts
or Uniform Trade Secrets Act to determine whether the requested
information constitutes a trade secret.' Once the discovering party
establishes both necessity and relevance, courts use a balancing test
40. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
42. See id.
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
44. Id.
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
46. See Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability
Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REv. 771, 779 (1990).
2000]
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to determine whether the need for the information outweighs the
potential harm of disclosure."
Ostensibly, protective orders are more readily available in civil
actions than in criminal cases, "where the accused enjoys a panoply
of constitutional rights unavailable to civil litigants."48 However,
under section 1835 of the Economic Espionage Act, Congress
emphasized the need to protect trade secrets and attempted to
provide a mechanism for preserving their confidentiality. 9 Unlike
most proceedings, in which discovery orders are not final orders for
purposes of appeal, section 1835 provides for an interlocutory
appeal from a "decision or order of a district court authorizing or
directing the disclosure of any trade secret."50
III. Analysis
Theoretically, under both the common law and the Economic
Espionage Act, in order to prove that someone has
misappropriated a trade secret an injured party must prove that
such a secret actually exists.5 1 Therefore, a company seeking a
remedy for trade secret theft may face having to disclose its
valuable confidential information through discovery. 2 Imax v.
CT13 and United States v. Hsu,54 decided within one week of each
47. See In re Remington Arms Co., 952 F.2d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir. 1991);
American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 742-3 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 326 (10th Cir.
1981); Hartley Pen Co. v. United States District Court, 287 F.2d 324, 331 (9th Cir.
1961).
48. Kenneth Rosenblatt, Criminal Law and the Information Age: Protecting
Trade Secrets from Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 8 COMPUTER LAW. 15, 15 (1991)
(discussing a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an open and public trial).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (Supp. IV 1998).
50. Id.
51. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985); 18 U.S.C. §
1831-1839, (1998).
52. See Corporate Legal Times Roundtable, supra note 31, at 48. John K.
Williamson, chief counsel, intellectual property, PPG Industries Inc. noted that
depending on who will be a defendant in an action, "you in essence disclose the
trade secret information you're trying to protect to someone who hasn't yet had
access to it." Id.; see also, Efrem M. Grail, et al., A District Court Ruling Could
Deter Corporations From Reporting the Theft of Trade Secrets if the Proprietary
Information is not Shielded from Defense Attorneys, THE NAT'L LAW J., Aug. 17,
1998, at B5 ("Corporate counsel, since the passage of the EEA and before, have
cautioned their high-technology clients from rushing to report suspected thefts,
fearing that their clients' trade secrets would all too quickly become public
knowledge in the course of a criminal investigation and the resulting
prosecution.").
53. 152 F.3d 1161, 1165.
54. 155 F.3d 189.
[Vol. 104:3
PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS
other at opposite ends of the country, have put this theory into
practice. Although Imax and Hsu ultimately reached different
conclusions, Imax confirms and Hsu does little to allay corporate
America's worst fears about the pitfalls of discovery in trade secret
theft cases. Both cases show an alarming alacrity on the part of
judges to compel discovery of trade secrets to direct competitors
alleged to have committed flagrant misdeeds, based on a
complacent belief in the efficacy of limited protective orders. In
each case, the court should have allowed the plaintiff or
prosecution to prove misappropriation of trade secrets not by
divulging those very secrets to the defense, but by focusing on the
nature and quality of the defendants' acts.
A. The Imax Case
In Imax, the famed manufacturer of rolling loop film projectors
alleged that Cinema Technologies, Inc. (CTI) misappropriated
Imax technology.55 Imax had patented the film projector in 1971,
but had wisely withheld from the patent application specific
tolerances and dimensions that could still qualify as trade secrets. 6
When CTI unveiled its rolling loop film projector in 1990, Imax
claimed that CTI stole secret information by gaining access to and
studying the projectors of Imax customers under false pretenses.
57
During the pretrial phase, CTI "asked Imax to 'identify the
entire content of each and every trade secret' allegedly
misappropriated by CTI.,1 8 Imax objected to the request on the
grounds that it was premature, overly broad, and unduly
burdensome: Imax had not yet had time to identify the specific
aspects of the technology CTI may have stolen.59
Essentially, Imax's position was that CTI may have only
misappropriated A, B, and C, but that CTI was asking to see D
through Z as well. 60 Imax wanted more time and more information
from the defendants before consenting to turn over its technology
in toto, but the magistrate ruled against Imax.1 Imax tried to avoid
disclosing too much of its confidential information in its response
55. See Imax, 152 F.3d at 1163.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 1165.
59. See id.




by referring to "every dimension and tolerance that defines or
reflects" the design of a particular aspect of the machine.62
CTI moved for summary judgment, and the district court
granted it, ruling that Imax's failure to identify the precise
numerical dimensions and tolerances of the film projector defeated
the trade secrets claim.63  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, stating that under California law,' a plaintiff suing for
theft of trade secrets must "identify the trade secrets and carry the
burden of showing that they exist., 65 Furthermore, the court noted
the rule that the plaintiff must describe the subject matter of the
trade secret "with sufficient particularity to separate it from matters
of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those
persons.., skilled in the trade. 66
The Ninth Circuit criticized Imax's use of the "catchall phrase
'including every dimension and tolerance that defines or reflects
that design,' " and held that sufficient specificity could be achieved
by nothing less than the identification of the machine's exact
numerical dimensions and tolerances.67 Imax argued that the
proffered level of specificity satisfied the standards established in
Forro Precision, Inc. v. International Business Machines,68 a decision
in which the Ninth Circuit held that IBM's reference to
"dimensions and tolerances" sufficed to claim trade secrets in
engineering drawings and blueprints. 6 However, the Imax court
distinguished the present facts from those of Forro, noting that the
Forro plaintiff's reference to "dimensions and tolerances" did not
62. Id. at 1166. Imax's Fourth Supplemental Response enumerated items (a)-
(cb) as follows:
Imax believes that CTI has misappropriated all or part of the following
Imax trade secrets embodied in Imax's projector system:
bb. the design of the cam unit, including every dimension and tolerance
that defines or reflects that design;
bd. the manner of operation of the cam unit;
be. the manner in which the cam unit is lubricated;
bf. the design of the film arms, including every dimension and tolerance
that defines or reflects that design.
Id.
63. See id. at 1164.
64. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(West 1997). California has adopted the
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACr, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985).
65. Imax, 152 F.3d at 1164 (citing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991
F.2d 511, 522 (9th Cir. 1993)).
66. Id. at 1165 (citing Universal Analytics v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp. 914
F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990)).
67. See id. at 1167.
68. 673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982).
69. See Imax, 152 F.3d at 1166-67 (citing Forro Prescision, 673 F.2d at 1057).
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doom the trade secret claim because the plaintiff provided a great
deal of evidence that the defendant had acquired trade secret
material in the form of engineering drawings and blueprints.7"
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the complex and
sophisticated nature of the subject matter would prevent any trier
of fact from determining on its own which of the machine's many
"dimensions and tolerances" were trade secrets.7' Nor could CTI
be expected to be able to rebut the trade secrets claim without
knowing exactly which "dimensions and tolerances" Imax had
accused it of stealing.72
At first blush, the court seems right to distinguish the facts of
Forro from those in the Imax case;73 but the court overlooked
certain critical facts that show the underlying similarities between
the cases. Ultimately, the court went too far in Imax by
unnecessarily tying the plaintiff's hands. The court distinguished
Forro because IBM referred to "dimensions and tolerances"
contained in engineering drawings and blueprints for a device that
had not yet been sold publicly when Forro allegedly
misappropriated them.7 ' Responding to Imax's argument, the court
emphasized that its Forro holding was limited to claiming trade
secrets in drawings and blueprints.75 This is so presumably because
such documents are so obviously proprietary in nature as evident in
their ability to be presented in tangible form. The court was
unwilling to extend such a low threshold of specificity to Imax,
whose rolling loop projector had been manufactured and sold since
1971.76 However, the court overlooked some of the details of
Imax's case that seem to favor a standard similar to that enunciated
in Forro. Imax claimed that two CTI engineers fraudulently gained
unrestricted access to a projector and service manual by
misrepresenting the nature of their work to the head of theater
operations at Great America Theme Park in California.77 Also,
Imax had provisions in its contracts with all of its customers
forbidding them from revealing any confidential information
concerning the system.7 1 Significantly, Imax manu-factured its
projector on a relatively small scale by selling only about 100
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1167.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1166-67.
74. See Imax, 152 F.3d at 1166-67; see also Forro, 673 F.2d at 1049-50.
75. See Imax, 152 F.3d at 1167.





machines worldwide in over 20 years. " This suggests that the
confidentiality provision in its sales and lease contracts constituted
a meaningful and conscientious attempt to protect proprietary
information.
CTI could have legitimately reverse-engineered the projector
by simply buying a model, but there may be several reasons not
make such a purchase. First, it would have been much cheaper to
gain access, authorized or otherwise, to someone else's projector
than to purchase a model. Also, because Imax carefully selected its
customers with a view toward maintaining the technology's
secrecy,8' Imax probably would not have sold a projector to CTI.
Thus, although Imax arguably placed its projection technology
in the public domain when it sold a projector, Imax made, in the
language of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, "efforts that [were]
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.,
8'
Because Imax tried to limit access to its projectors and service
manuals through contractual agreements with customers, those
machines and manuals should be considered as sufficiently
proprietary in nature as IBM's drawings and blueprints.' If so,
Imax's reference to "dimensions and tolerances" would suffice
under the Forro standard.83
This case, therefore, should not have turned on Imax's
willingness to turn over all of the specific dimensions and tolerances
that CTI requested in its interrogatory, but rather on Imax's ability
to prove that CTI fraudulently gained access to Great America's
projector.8' If Imax's allegations of fraud were true, the workings of
the machine and its manual would maintain proprietary in status.
If, on the other hand, Great America allowed CTI to reverse
engineer its Imax projector, Imax's cause of action would be in
breach of contract against Great America.
Perhaps the reason the court failed to delve into the Imax facts
outlined above is the court's unquestioned reliance on the efficacy
of the protective order. The court briefly, and rather dismissively,
noted that Imax could have no well-founded fear of disclosing its
trade secrets in this discovery process because Imax and CTI
stipulated to a protective order under which access to highly
sensitive proprietary information would be limited to certain
79. See id.
80. See Imax 152 F.3d at 1163.
81. 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985).
82. See Imax 152 F.3d at 1163.
83. See Forro, 673 F.2d at 1056-57.
84. See Imax 152 F.3d at 1163 n.1.
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individuals who were under order not to use such information for
"any business, proprietary, commercial or competitive purpose.""
Thus, the court evinced a perhaps overly trusting belief that
defendants who may have already demonstrated a disregard for the
law will now obey the court's order under a mere threat of being
held in contempt of court.86
It is this gloss on Imax's position that most reveals the court's
failure or reluctance to acknowledge that CTI's discovery request
constituted a savvy maneuver for forcing Imax to either concession
or a Pyrrhic victory.' By rather cavalierly shrugging off as
unfounded any fear Imax may have had of surrendering its trade
secrets to CTI, the court never had to reach the point of balancing
the competing interests potentially at stake: the plaintiff's need to
protect its business secrets without further compromising them,
versus the defendant's need for the information.8
Ultimately, the court should have looked at the broader
picture, and considered the nature of the allegations and
defendant's behavior before rushing to compel discovery.
However, the court could have achieved a more equitable result by
giving Imax more time to learn, through discovery, exactly which of
the "dimensions and tolerances" CTI had actually mis-
appropriatedf In this way, Imax would have to turn over to the
defense only those particular trade secrets that had already been
uncovered by CTI, without compromising any details that remained
confidential.9' Instead, the court followed a national trend of
adopting a presumption in favor of disclosing discovery materials.92
85. Id. at 1168 n.9 ("Moreover the parties' stipulated protective order
removed the possibility that Imax's resistance was properly based on a fear of
surrendering its secrets to CTI.").
86. See id. at 1166-67; see also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v.
The Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 290 (D. Del. 1985) (acknowledging the fact
that "disclosure of trade secrets in litigation, even with the use of an appropriate
protective order, could 'become by indirection the means of ruining an honest and
profitable enterprise' " and also recognizing that compelling disclosure of a secret
formula could be a "bludgeon in the hands of plaintiffs to force a favorable
settlement.").
87. See Imax, 152 F.3d at 1166-67.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 1163.
90. See id. at 1165.
91. See id.
92. See Note, Trade Secrets in Discovery: From First Amendment Disclosure to
Fifth Amendment Protection, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1330, 1331 (1991) (noting that the
trend has also been to make it more difficult to obtain protective orders).
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A similar outcome threatened to occur in United States v. Hsu93
until the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
discovery order, which would have compelled the prosecution to
turn over to defendants the very documents that they were accused
of trying to steal.94 Unlike Imax, the Hsu case rested on a federal
criminal statute, the Economic Espionage Act or 1996 (EEA),9
rather than state civil law. Nevertheless, the EEA's definition of
the term "trade secret" is based largely on the definition
promulgated in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.' Therefore, the
existence of a trade secret would also be a material element in
proving the crime defined under section 1832 as "theft of trade
secrets. ' 97
B. The Hsu Case
One of the first few criminal cases to be brought under the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996,98 the Hsu case involved an FBI
sting operation to catch Kai-Lo Hsu, Chester S. Ho, and Jessica
Chou, members of a Taiwanese company, in their alleged
conspiracy and attempt to steal corporate trade secrets from
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company." Hsu and his compatriots
contacted an undercover agent posing as a technological
information broker in an attempt to purchase Bristol-Myers' recipe
for Taxol, an anticancer drug, from a "corrupt" Bristol-Myers
scientist."°
Bristol-Myers cooperated with FBI agents who needed to
ensure that the documents they purported to be offering Hsu
appeared to be authentic.' Thus, Bristol-Myers lent the FBI one
93. 982 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
94. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 191 (3d Cir. 1998).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831-1839 (Supp. IV 1998).
96. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 14 (1996).
97. Id. But see Hsu, 155 F.3d at 198 n.15 (emphasizing on appeal that an actual
trade secret need not exist to convict defendants of attempt and conspiracy to steal
trade secrets, and that disclosure of the actual trade secrets may not be necessary
to prove the existence of a trade secret for purposes of proving the completed
crime of trade secret theft).
98. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 194 n.4 (noting that only five prosecutions were
publicly announced in the first eighteen months of the statute's existence, and
commenting that such prosecutions are likely to remain few in the near future
because Attorney General Janet Reno has precluded the government from
pursuing charges under the EEA without personal approval of the Attorney
General or her deputy until October 2001).





of its scientists, who discussed Taxol production with Hsu and his
colleagues and showed them documents outlining specific
technological procedures and data.ln' Hsu and the others never
obtained possession of the documents because, upon coming to
terms on the illegal deal, federal agents burst into the hotel room
where the meeting was taking place and arrested the alleged
perpetrators.10 3
After a federal grand jury indicted Hsu, Ho, and Chou," the
government moved for a protective order whereby the documents
in question would be reviewed in camera and redacted as to any
confidential trade secrets. The defense objected to this motion on
the grounds that it needed to review the actual trade secrets the
defendants were accused of trying to steal in order to assert a
defense of legal impossibility. " ' Instead, the defense proposed a
less restrictive protective order that would allow a list of people to
view the documents, including defendants, defense attorneys,
outside experts and prospective witnesses."l Those individuals, as
in the Imax case, would sign an agreement not to use the
information for anything but defense purposes."
In its brief, the government correctly argued that it had a
legitimate interest in protecting the integrity and confidentiality of
trade secrets."9 The government further contended that the actual
102. See id.
103. See Frances A. McMorris, Corporate-Spy Case Rebounds on Bristol,
WALL. ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at B5.
104. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 191-2.
105. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1023.
106. See id.
107. See id. The Stipulation and Protective Order paragraph 3 reads: "All
Discovery Material that is designated 'Confidential Material' shall be used solely
to prepare for or conduct pretrial, trial, and appellate proceedings in this action."
Id. at 1029. Paragraph 4 reads as follows:
All Discovery material that is designated as Confidential Material shall
be retained by the parties and their counsel and furnished, shown,
disseminated, disclosed or divulged only to the following persons:
a. any of the defendants;
b. defense counsel;
c. witnesses and prospective witnesses to the extent reasonably
deemed necessary by defense counsel to prepare for, or give,
testimony regarding facts at issue in this case;
d. independent outside experts and consultants retained by the
defendant(s) to furnish technical or expert services or give testimony
in connection with this case; and
e. the Court, Court personnel, Court reporters, and the jury.
Id. at 1030.
108. See id. at 1029-30.
109. See id. at 1023.
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documents the undercover agent brought to the meeting were
immaterial because even if those papers had contained fake
formulas, the defendants could still have committed a crime.11° The
federal prosecutors in Hsu also put their finger on a critical issue
ignored by the Ninth Circuit in Imax: graymail."' The prosecution
argued that without a protective order to prevent defendants from
reviewing the actual trade secret documents, defendants could press
for access to sensitive information and then threaten to disclose the
information publicly in an effort to force the prosecution to drop
the charges."2
Such a move would have worked, according to the attorney
prosecuting the case.' After the district court denied the
government's proposed protective order, Assistant United States
Attorney Richard Goldberg announced that if the court's ruling
were upheld, he would take further steps to prevent the trade
secrets from being revealed, possibly even dismissing the case.'
The district court's denial of the protective order and
acceptance of the defense's proposed less restrictive order came in
an opinion that was thoughtful, but based on a faulty premise. 5 As
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out, the district court's
analysis was founded on an incorrect reading of the indictment: the
district court believed that the defendants were charged with the
completed offense of theft of trade secrets, when actually they were
charged only with attempting to steal, and conspiring to steal trade
secrets. 6 Nevertheless, the reasoning in the district court's opinion
is instructive because it gives a glimpse of what could happen if the
facts were as the district court assumed them to be, and because it
elucidates the significance of the Third Circuit's reversal.
110. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1023.
111. See id; see also Rosenblatt, supra note 48, at 15 ("The practice of
'greymail,' a tactic honed in national security cases wherein the defense threatens
to disclose classified information incident to trial, is alive and well in trade secret
prosecutions.").
112. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1023.
113. See McMorris, supra note 103, at B5.
114. See id; see also Corporate Legal Times Roundtable, supra note 31, at 48.
David Green, Deputy Chief of the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section of the U.S. Department of Justice notes, "We are definitely sensitive to the
issue of disclosure. Our appealing the Hsu case to the Third Circuit is indicative of
how careful we take our responsibilities under the Act to preserve the
confidentiality of the information." Id.
115. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 1998).
116. See id. (noting that the court below wrongly cited to a non-existent section
1832(2) in the statute, and that defendants have been charged with violating only
sections 1832(a)(4) and (a)(5) of the EEA).
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Because the district court believed that the defendants were
charged with the completed offense of stealing trade secrets, the
court concluded that the government had to prove that the material
Hsu, Ho, and Chou were attempting to buy actually was a trade
secret.17 Thus, the court found that issuing the protective order
requested by the government would amount to relieving the
prosecution of the burden of proving an essential element of its
118case.
In a section purportedly analyzing whether or not the
government had a legitimate interest in protecting Bristol-Myers'
trade secrets,119 the court instead focused on the interests of the
defendants.'20 The court concluded that giving the defense redacted
documents during discovery would interfere with defendants' Sixth
Amendment right to cross-examination at trial. 2'
The district court further noted that the actual precise formulas
in question were relevant and material to the case because
defendants had alleged and the government had not contested that
a great deal of information regarding Taxol production was already
publicly available through patents and scientific literature.122 The
court contrasted this situation with one in which a company has
taken extreme measures to protect a trade secret and may therefore
never need to disclose the actual secret in litigation to prove that it
123was indeed a trade secret.
Finally, the district court considered the government's fear that
defendants would use trade secret information to "graymail" the
117. See United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
118. See id. (examining sections 1832(a) and 1839(3) of the EEA for the
definition of trade secret and concluding from this that the existence of a trade
secret is an essential element of the crime and is therefore a question of fact which
the defendants have the right to have a jury decide).
119. See id. at 1023-24.
120. See id. at 1024; see also Hsu 155 F.3d at 198 n.13 ("Although seeking to
address the government's interests in the confidentiality of trade secrets, the
district court concentrated on the defendants' rights and did not engage in any
discussion of the relationship between the two.").
121. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1025.
122. See id. at 1026. The court made reference to the Department of Justice's
Manual on Intellectual Property prosecutions which notes that in order to build a
case that information is a trade secret "i.e., that the information was not generally
available to the public.., prosecutors should make sure that the information had
not been publicly disclosed through, for example, technical journals or other
publications and should determine whether the information was obvious to the
victim's competitors in the industry." Id. at 1025.
123. See id. at 1026 (using the Coke recipe as an example and detailing the
lengths to which Coke purportedly goes to protect the recipe, but noting that even
this formula is not sacrosanct); see also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc.
v. The Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 290 (D. Del. 1985).
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prosecutors by threatening to expose the secrets unless the charges
are dropped.'24 The court acknowledged the reasonableness of the
government's lack of trust in defendants who may be linked to
wrongdoers outside the country and hence the court's contempt
power. 25 However, the court simply stated that the defendant's
proposed order eliminates this problem by requiring that in order
to gain access to the Taxol formula, individuals must first sign an
agreement binding them to the terms of the protective order.'26
Thus it seems that, as in the Imax case, the court reposed too much
confidence that defendants would be less willing to violate a court
order than to violate, in this case, a federal criminal statute.
On the prosecution's appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling.' The appeals court pointed out the error
below in reading the indictment to include a charge of the
completed offense of trade secret theft.'s The Third Circuit then
held that the charges of attempt and conspiracy to steal trade
secrets do not necessitate turning over the actual trade secrets to
the defense.'29
The appeals court first determined that the defense of legal
impossibility is not available for crimes of attempt and conspiracy
under the Economic Espionage Act."3 The court based this ruling
on an examination of the EEA's legislative history, and the
sweeping effect Congress intended for the legislation.' Finding
otherwise, the court said, would also have the "bizarre effect of
forcing the government to disclose trade secrets to the very
124. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1026-27.
125. See id. at 1026 ("The Government can also be forgiven for not reposing
much trust in defendants who it contends are linked to wrongdoers far removed
from the borders of our contempt power.").
126. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1026 n.5.
127. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 191 (3d Cir. 1998).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 200-01.
131. See id. The court analyzed the legislative history and compared it to that
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1976). Id. The court found that, as the Drug Control Act was designed to offer a
comprehensive solution, the EEA was drafted to provide a comprehensive
mechanism for "curtailing the escalating threat of corporate espionage." Id. Thus,
the court concluded that is "highly unlikely that Congress would have wanted the
courts to thwart that solution by permitting defendants to assert the common law
defense of legal impossibility." Id. at 202. The court also found it significant that
the EEA was drafted at a time when the abolition of legal impossibility was
already the overwhelming modern position. Id.
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persons suspected of trying to steal them, thus gutting enforcement
efforts under the EEA.
' 132
As a result, the court next ruled that the Taxol trade secrets
were not material to the defense case because there would be no
need to prove that defendants tried to steal real trade secrets in
order to convict them of the crimes of attempt or conspiracy under
the EEA133  Ultimately, the appeals court reversed the district
court, but remanded the action back to the lower court to consider
defense arguments that were raised on appeal for the first time.'
The court noted its skepticism regarding the materiality and
relevance of the trade secret information to the new issues raised by
defense on appeal, 35 but concluded that it must leave these issues to
the lower court.136
With the Third Circuit's ruling in Hsu, the government and
Bristol-Myers seem to have won the battle, and to have paved at
least part of the way for companies who may choose to cooperate
with federal prosecutions in the future. However, because the
court's holding is limited to the facts of the case and the issues
presented on appeal, Hsu leaves some doubt about where courts
will strike the balance between protecting the rights of defendants
and those of corporations. As we have seen, if left to the district
court, that balance will likely be weighed with a thumb on
defendants' side of the scale.
137
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the Third Circuit would
have reached a different conclusion than the district court even if
132. Hsu, 155 F.3d at 202.
133. See id. at 204.
134. See id. at 205.
135. See id. (noting that on appeal, defense counsel raised for the first time the
potential defenses of entrapment, outrageous government conduct, and
jurisdiction).
136. See id. at 205 (citing Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d
Cir. 1994), and stating that "this court has consistently held that it will not consider
issues that are raised for the first time on appeal").
137. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 198 n.13; see also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Shreveport, Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 293 (D. Del. 1985). The
court in Hsu notes that:
the balance between the need for information and the need for protection
against the injury caused by disclosure is tilted in favor of disclosure once
relevance and necessity have been shown. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, 'orders forbidding any disclosure of trade secrets or
confidential commercial information are rare.' Federal Open Market
Committee v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 (1979). A survey of the relevant
case law reveals that discovery is virtually always ordered once the
movant has established that the secret information is relevant and
necessary.
Hsu, 155 F.3d at 198 n.13.
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the facts had been as the district court believed them to be. While
the appellate court declined to decide whether failing to disclose
trade secrets would undermine the constitutional rights of
defendants charged with the completed offense of trade secret
theft,3 ' the court did indicate, however obliquely, that it might have
found that the Taxol formula itself is not material to the existence
of the trade secret.'39 In an analysis decidedly different from that of
the district court, the appeals court indicated that factors other than
the content of the secret may be determinative under the EEA.4 °
The court emphasized that whether information qualifies as a trade
secret under the EEA depends on factual questions such as how the
information has been guarded by its owner and whether it is
ascertainable by the public.14' Thus, the court seems inclined,
should the issue arise, to apply the kind of analysis that should have
been used in Imax: that is, first to determine whether a trade secret
exists based not on the substantive content of the information but
rather on the owner's conduct in maintaining its confidentiality and
therefore its value; and second to focus on the defendants' behavior
to determine whether it was legitimate reverse engineering or
independent invention, or misappropriation. 42  This inclination,
however, is cold comfort to a company contemplating a criminal
action under the EEA.
IV. Conclusion
Imax and Hsu demonstrate one problem among many that
companies encounter when deciding whether and how to proceed
in trade secret theft cases.' 43 Although Hsu may be a limited victory
for the government and cooperating corporations, the law in this
area appears to be unsettled and presents tremendous risks for
corporations seeking to maintain the value of their work product.
The two cases discussed here have not yet had devastating
results for the companies seeking to protect their trade secrets.
138. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 197 ("We need not decide, as the district court did,
whether a failure to disclose trade secrets would undermine the constitutional
rights of defendants charged with a completed offense under the statute."); see also
id. at 198 n.15 ("We emphasize that we need not reach, and are not determining,
the issue addressed by the district court of whether the disclosure of trade secrets
is mandated by the Constitution or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure if a
defendant is charged with the actual theft of trade secrets.").
139. See id. at 198 n.15.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc. 153 F.3d 1161, 1167-68 (9th 1998).
143. See Grail, supra note 52, at 5.
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Imax was able to survive a defense motion for summary judgment
on its unfair competition claim, because the court held that under
California law, a plaintiff can maintain such a claim regardless of
whether it demonstrates that it possessed a legally protectable trade
secret.1" Thus, Imax has not been completely precluded from
pursuing CTI in this matter even though it decided not to disclose
its film technology to the defendants .' Likewise, Bristol-Myers has
thus far been able to avoid disclosing its Taxol formula to the
defendants in Hsu.' However, both of these cases serve as further
reminders of the complex considerations and cost-benefit analyses
companies must make in deciding whether and how to take action
to protect valuable trade secrets.
Susan V. Metcalfe
144. See Imax, 152 F.3d at 1169.
145. See id.
146. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 1998).
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